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Concerning Railways in Class of Cities.
Under the Constitution of Pennsylvania, prohibiting local or special
legislation, classification of subjects, including cities, is permissible, and
legislation applying alike to all the members of a class is not local or
special, but general, though there be only one city in the class. Laws
which operate upon the exercise of some power or duty of a municipal
nature are general. An Act providing that "passenger railways in any
and all cities of the first class . . . may use other than animal power
whenever authorized to do so by the councils of such city, and
the limitations contained in any of the charters of. passenger railway
companies, restricting them to the use of horse power, be and they are
hereby repealed," being upon a subject as to which the classification of
cities is proper, is a general law.
ABSTRACT FROM OPINION OF MITCHELL, J.

By the Act of May 8, 1876, P. L. 147, "passenger
railways in any and all cities of the first class . . . may
use other than animal power . . . whenever authorized
so to do by the councils of such city, and the limitations
contained in any of the charters of passenger railway companies, restricting them to the use of horse-power, be and
the same are hereby repealed, provided," etc. If this
statute is constitutional, it supplies the necessary authority.
It is claimed, however, that it transgresses the prohibition
of Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution, in that it is
a local or special law amending or extending the charter of
a corporation. But under the settled construction of this
section, classification of subjects, including cities, is per' Reported
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ABSTRACT FROM OPINION.

missible, and legislation which applies alike to all the
members of a class is not local or special, but general.
The important inquiry, therefore, is whether the Act of
1876 is upon a subject as to which the classification of
cities is proper. Repeated decisions of this Court have
marked out the lines upon which such classification may
proceed. It is not necessary to cite them all, but in one
of the latest, Wyoming Street, 137 Pa., 494 (503), our
brother WILLIAMS has put the test into the compactest
phrase: "The test, therefore, by which all laws may be
tried is their effect. If they operate upon the ekercise of
some power or duty of a municipality of the given class
. . . they are general," and he gives as an example, "an
.Act relating to the lighting of streets in cities of the third
class would be a geheral law." The control of the vehicles
which shall be used on the public streets for the general conveyance of passengers, the rate of speed, and the motive
power by which they shall be propelled, is equally or even
more peculiarly the subject of municipal duty. In fact,
public conveyances, whether ferry-boats, barges, hackney
coaches, or omnibusses have been subjects of police regulation and license as long as they have been known or used
in Pennsylvania. The Act of 1876 is, therefore, upon a
subject proper for municipal classification and is a general
law. It takes off restrictions previously existing as to the
motive power of cars upon streets, and commits the whole
subject to the control- of the cities themselves acting
through their councils. This is its effect, and that is the
test of its constitutionality.
That incidentally it has
affected and enlarged the charters of certain railway corporations does not vitiate it as an exercise of unquestionable police'powers over subjects within their proper province. The second clause of the Act expressly repealing
the charter restrictions to horse-power as a motor, is not an
essential part of its substance, and might have been omitted
without impairing its general scope and effect. It was
manifestly added to prevent any question of the application
of the Act to companies already chartered.
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The learned Court below thought itself bound by the
decision in Weinman v. Pass. R. W. Co., 1i8 Pa., 192,
but there is a distinction between the cases that is capable
of sharp definition. The statute involved in that case was
one relating to the formation of corporations. In the
language of the opinion, "the subject of this statute is
street railway companies, which is a subject for general
legislation; while the statute professes to deal only with a
limited number of these railways, and these are selected
by reference to their location in certain cities. Under the
guise of a general law, we have here one which is special,
because it relates to a few members of the general class of
corporations known as street railway companies; and local
because its operations are confined to particular localities."
The essence of that decision is that the formation of corporations, their corporate powers, capital stock, dividends,
etc., have no relation to the classification of -cities, and
cannot be made in any way to depend thereon. The Act
of 1876, on the contrary, as we have seen, has nothing to
(To with the formation, stock, or dividends of passenger
railway companies, but refers solely to the management of
their cars on the public streets, a subject having close relations to the powers and duties of the municipal authorities
to which the Act commits its control.
CLASSIFICATION PER-MISSIBLE WITHOUT INFRINGING CONSTITUTIONAL
INHIBITION OF LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION.

The decision in Reeves v. Continental Railway Co. seems so consistent with the trend of judicial
precedents, not only in Pennsylvania but elsewhere, that the following consideration of the authorities should be regarded as convenient rather than as strictly
necessary.
In the leading case of Wheeler
v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa., 338 (1875),
it was said by PAXSON, J. (on p.
384): "A statute which relates to
persons or things as a class is a
general law, while a statute which

relates to particular persons or
things of a class is special, and
comes within the constitutional
prohibition" of the enactment of
local or special laws. This definition has been approved and followed in other States, and notably
in In re Application of Church, 92
N. Y., 1, 4 (1883); In re New York
Elevated R. R. Co., 70 Id., 327,
350 (1877); State v. City of Trehton,
42 N. J. L., 13 Vroom, 486, 488
(I88O); State z. Herrmiann, 75 Mo.,
.34o, 354 (882); State -,.Tolle, 71
Id., 645, 65o (,88o). In Wheeler z.
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Philadelphia, supra, the Act of city in the State at the present
May 23, z874, dividing the cities of time containing a population of
Pennsylvania into three classes as 300,000, is the city of Philadelphia.
follows: Those containing a popula- It is also true that the '.ty of Pittstion exceeding 30o,oco, constitut- burgh is rapidly approaching that
ing the first class; the cities of less
number, if it has not already
population, but exceeding ioo,oco,
reached it, by recent enlargements
making the second class, and cities
of its territory. Legislation is inhaving a population between io,ooo tended not only to meet the wants
and ioo,ooo, comprising the third of the present, but to provide for
class, was assailed for the reason
the future. It deals not with the
that "it creates an unconstitutional
past, but, in theory at least, an- classification of the cities of the
ticipates the needs of a State
Commonwealth, and by indirection
healthy with a vigorous developlegislates specially for the city of ment. It is intended to be perPhiladelphia," which was the only manent. At no distant day Pittscity whose population brought it
burgh will probably become a city
within the first class. A few of the first class; and Scranton, or
months previous to the enactment
others of the rapidly-growing inthe new Constitution of the State terior towns, will take the place of
was adopted, containing the new the city of Pittsburgh as a city of
provision: "The General Assembly
the second class. In the meantime,
shall not pass any local or special
is the classification as to bities of
law ..
. .
regulating the, af- the first class bad because Philafairs of counties, cities, townships,
delphia is the only one of the class?
wards, boroughs or school dis- -We think not. Classification dbes
tricts," etc.: Constitution Pennsyl- not depend upon numbers. The
vania, 1874, Art. III, 7; 1 Purd.
first man, Adam, was as distinctly
"Dig., 29. Similar provisions ap- a class when the breath of life was
pear in the Constitutions of most
breathed into him, as at any subof the States: Stimson's Am. Stat.
sequent period. The word is used
Law, 395- But the Act of 1874,
not to designate numbers, but a
supra, was held constitutional,
rank or order of persons or things;
PAXSON, J., saying (p. 349-351):
in society it is used to indicate
"But it is contended that-even if equality, or persons distinguished
the right to classify exists, the exby common characteristics, as the
ercise of it by the legislature, in
trading classes, the laboring classes;
this instance, is in violation of the
in science it is a division or arrangeConstitution, for the reason that
ment containing the subordinate
there 'is but one city in the State
divisions of order, genus and spewith a population exceeding 300,cies. If the classification of cities
ooo; that to form a class containing
is in violation ot the Constitution,
but one city is in point of fact
it follows, of necessity, that Philalegislating for that one city, to the delphia, as a city of the first class,
-exclusion of all others, and conmust be denied the legislation
stitutes the local and special legisnecessary to its present prosperity
lation prohibited by the Constituand future development, or that
tion. This argument is plausible,
the small inland cities must be
but unsound. It is true, the only burdened with legislation wholly
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unsuited to their needs. For if the
Constitution means what the complainants aver that it does, Philadelphia can have no legislation that
is not common to all other cities of
the State. And for this there is
absolutely no remedy, but a change
in the organic law itself. This is a
serious question. We have but to
turn to the statute-hook to realize
the vast amount of legislation in
the past, special to the city of
Philadelphia. We speak not now
of what is popularly known as
special legislation, private acts,
etc., but of proper legislation,
affecting the whole city, and indispensable to its prosperity .....
We have but to glance at this legislation to see that the most of it is
wholly unsuited to small inland
cities, and that to inflict it upon
them would be little short of a
calamity. Must the'city of Scrantbn, over one hundred miles from
tide-water, with a stream hardly
large enough to float a batteau, be
subjected to quarantine regulations,
and have its lazaretto? Must the
legislation for a great commercial
and manufacturing city, with a
population approaching r,ooo,oco,
be regulated by the wants or necessities of an inland city of io,ooo
inhabitants? If the Constitution
answers this question affirmatively,
we are bound by it, however much
we might question its wisdom.
But no such construction is to be
gathered from its terms, and we
will not presume that the framers
of that instrument, or the people
who ratified it, intended that the
machinery of their State government should be so bolted and
riveted down by the fundamental
law as to be unable to move and
perform its necessary functions."
Strenuous effort was made in

Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa., 401 (1877)
to overturn the decision in Wheeler
v. Philadelphia, sufira, without
avail. It was held that an Act "in
relation to cities of the first and
second class, providing for the
levy, collection and disbursement
of taxes and water rents," was permissible legislation. It was said
(p- 411) pier curiam: "The power
to classify cities according to the
number of their population was
fully discussed and decided in the
case of Wheeler v. Philadelphia.
• . . We adhere to that decision.
. . . To say that no general law
can be passed to regulate a certain
subject because some of the classes
contained in the regulation do not
exist, or exist only in a limited
number, is to hold that no law can
be passed to provide for future
wants or necessities. . . . If the
classification had been different,
and the number of the population
to constitute a city of the first class
had been fixed at one million, would
the classification be void because
no city had yet reached that numher? The absurdity of that proposition is manifest, and it is simply
to say that no law can provide for
a state of affairs to which the subject is rapidly approaching, but
which it has not yet reached. If
the power to classify and regulate
the subject of cities generally be
admitted, and clearly it cannot be
successfully denied, the question of
local legislation is at an end; for
though it may happen that but one
city may fall within the class non
constat that others will not shortly
do so, and, therefore, may be provided for."
Legislation for classes, but not
for persons or things of a class, is
permissible in other States having
constitutional provisions prohibit-
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ing special or local legislation.
Walker v. City of Cincinnati, 21
Ohio St., 14 (1871) is one of the
earliest of cases of importance, and
was approved in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa., 338, 351 (1875).
An Act applying to all cities in the
State falling within a -specified
class is neither local nor special,
but of uniform operation: DAY, J.,
in Haskel v. City of Burlington,
30 Iowa, 232, 237 (1870). It was
said by MILLER, C. J., in Iowa
Railroad Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Id.,
112, 116 (1874), concerning a statute
whose constitutionality was questioned: "The Act applies to all
' counties, school districts, or other
falling
municipal corporations'
within the conditions mentioned
in the Act; and it is, ±herefore, not
a local or special law, but general."
In Pritchett v. Stanislaus County,
73 Cal.,31O(1887), anActdividingall
municipal corporations within the
State into six classes, according to
population, was held constitutional.
See also Thomason v. Ashworth,
Id., 73; 78, per THORNTON,J. (1887);
Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal., 242
(i88o); Earle v. Board of Education,
Id., 489 (1880); McConihe v. State,
17 Fla., 238 (1879); State v. Stark,
i8 Id., 255 (i88i);-State v; Butts,
31 Kansas, 537 (1884); Gihnore v.
Hentig, 33 Id., 156 (1885); Mason
v. Spencer, 35 Id., 512 ([886). For
the purposes of legislation cities
constitute a class, and a law applicable to cities only is not unconstitutional: In re Commissioners
of Elizabeth, 49 N. J. L., 20 Vroom,
488 (1887); State v. City of Camden,
40 N.J. L., Ir Vroom, 156 (1878);
State v. Newark, Id., 7 , 550 (1878);
State v. Steen, 43 N. J. L., 14
Vroom, 542 (1881). A law applicable to all counties of a class, as
made or authorized by the Consti-

tution, is neither a local nor a
special law. If it applies to all the
counties of a class authorized by
the Constitution to be made, it is a
general law, and whether there
may Le few or many counties to
which its provisions will apply, is
a matter of no consequence: ScoT,
J., in Knickerbocker v. People, 102
A general
Ill., 218, 229 (1882).
law, unlimited as to time in its
operation, is not obnoxious to a
constitutional inhibition against
local legislation because it happens
that but one city in the State has
the population necessary to come
within its purview: Darrow v. People, 8 Colorado, 417 (1885). The
Act criticized in this case was for
the creation of a Superior Court.
HnLM, J., said (p. 418): "Denver,
it is true, is the only city to which
the Act at present applies. 'But the
Legislature clearly intended to provide for places that may hereafter.
"acquire the population mentioned.
The law is general and unlimited as
to time in its operation. There is
nothing unreasonable in the supposition that other towns and cities
within the State will eventually
contain twenty-five thousand inhabitants."
In re Application of Church, 92
N. Y., I (1883), an Act giving the
board of supervisors in any county
containing an incorporated city of
over iooooo inhabitants, where
contiguous territory in the county
has been mapped out into streets
and avenues, power to lay out, open,
grade and construct the same, and
to provide for the assessment of
damages on the property benefited,
was held not tobea local law within
the intendment of the State Constitution. FINCH, J., said (p. 4),
referring to the distinction between
local and general legislation, given
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by EARL, J., In re New York Elevated R. R. Co., 70 N. Y., 327, 350
(1877): "A law relating to particular persons or things as a class was
said to be general; while one relating to particular persons or things
of a class was deemed local and
private. The Act of 1881 [in question] relates to a class, and applies
to it as such, and not to the selected
or particular elements of which it
is composed. The class consists of
every county in the State having
within its boundaries a city of loo,ooo inhabitants, and territory beyond the city limits maplped into
streets and avenues. How many
such counties there are now, or may
be in the future, we do not know,
and it is not material that we should.
Whether many or few, the law operates upon, them all alike, and
reaches them, not by a separate
selection of one or more, but
through the general class of which
"they are individual elements."
EXRL, J., said, In re N.Y. Elevated
R. R. Co., supra: "A law granting
to all horse railway companies, elevated railway companies, the right
to lay down railroad tracks, would
be constitutional. It would operate
uniformly and generally upon all
companies in the same situation
and belonging to the same class, and
that would make it general." See,
also, People v. Newburgh and Shawangunk Plank Road Co., 86 N.Y.,
1, 7 (1881), per EARL, J., In re Application of Woolsey, 95 N. Y., 135
(1884). Statutes exempting citizens
in certain excepted counties of a
-State from the duty of fencing their
fields, and permitting them to let
their sheep run at large, confer
privileges denied to others within
the same class in other parts of the
State, and are therefore unconstitutional: Darling v. Rodgers, 7
10
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Kansas, 592 (1871); Robinson v.
Perry, 17 Id., 248 (1876); see, also,
People v. Central Pacific R. R.Co.,
43 Cal., 398 (1892); Brooks v. Hyde,
37 Id., 366 (1869); French v. Teschemaker, 24 Id., 518 (1864); People
'v. Judge of the Twelfth District, I7
Id., 547 (i861). In McGill v. State,
34 Ohio St., 228, 245 (1877), BOYNTON, J. says: "That a law ofa general nature must concern a subjectmatter existing and capable of uniform operation, cannot be denied;
for, if the law, from the nature of
its subject-matter, is not susceptible
of an operation throughout the
State, it cannot, within the meaning of the Constitution, be a law of
general nature." See, also, Fields v.
Commissioners, 36 Ohio St., 476
(188i); State v. Riordan, 24 Wis.,
484 (1869); ex parte Westerfield,
55 Cal., 550 (188o); State v. California Mining Co., 15 Nevada, 234

(188o).
In McAunnich v. Railroad Co., 20
Iowa, 338, 343 (1866), COLE, J.;
says of laws conferring gertain
rights, powers and privileges on
cities of the first class, and different and less powers and privileges
on cities of the second class, and
still different and less upon towns:
"Each class has its powers and
privileges different from the other.
These laws are general and uniform,
not because they operate upon
every person in the State, for they
do not, but because every person
who is brought within the relations
and circumstances provided for is
affected by the law. They are general and uniform in their operation
upon all persons in the like situation, and the fact of their being
general and uniform is not affected,
by the number of persons within
the scope of their operation." The
statute whose validity was attacked.
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provided that "every railroad coinpany shall be liable for all damages
sustained by any person, including
employees of the company, in consequence of any neglect of the
agents, or by any mismanagement
of the engineer or other employees
of the corporation, to any person
sustaining such damage." It was
urged that the Act was unconstitutional because limited in its operation to railroad companies, subjecting them to a liability from which
otherpersons and corporations were
exempt. But the statute was held to
be constitutional, for the reasons
stated by CoLu, J., supra. The
same Judge says of an Act providing for the taxation of express and
telegraph companies: "This Act
operates upon all corporations or
companies engaged in telegraph or
express business within this State,
and concerns the public. Itcannot,
therefore, be a special statute, but
it is a general statute :" U. S. Express Co. v. Ellyson, 28 Iowa, 370,
375 (1869). In C., B. & Q. R. .
Co. %v.
Iowa, 94 U. S., 155 (1876), it
was held that railroads within the
State could be classified according
to business, and a maximum ofrates
established for each of the classes,
since the operation tupon each class
was uniform within the constitutional requirement, and "a uniform rate of charges for all railroad
companies in the State. might
operate unjustly on some. It was
proper, therefore, to provide in
some way for an adaptation of the
rates to the circumstances of the
different roads; and the General
Assembly, in the exercise of its
legislative discretion, has seen fit
to do this by a system of classification :" per WAinE, C. J. (p. 164).
Justices FiELD and STRONG dissented. See, also, L. R. & Ft. S.

Ry. Co. v.Hanniford, 49 Ark., 291,
294, per BATTLE, J. (1887).
In State v. Parsons, 4oN.J..L., Ii
Vroom, 1 (1878), it was held that, a
general law as contradistinguished
from one special or local, is a law
that embraces a class of subjects or
places, and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to
such class. BEASLY, C. J., said
(p. 8): "A law settling the methods
by which all railroads should become incorporated would be special
in the sense that it would be confined in its operation to but a single
kind of corporation, and so a law
would be local by this same test
that should provide for the organization, under one system, of all
the municipal governments in the
State, as such a law would manifestly have a restricted effect with
respect to locality." In State z.
City of Trenton, 42 N. J. L., 13
Vroom, 486, 488 (1880) DixON, J.,
gave as an illustration that "a
statute giving to all cities border-ing upon tide-water the power to
construct docks or establish quarantine regulations, or providing
that in all towns having volunteer
fire departments the members of
the department should choose a
commission to govern them,"
would presumably be valid. Likewise "a statute declaring that all
cities containing a population over
a certain number shall have a given
number of voting places, and all
cities containing a lesser number
shall have a prescribed lesser number," would be obviously legal,
"because the classes of persons
thus distinguished from .each other
would naturally stand upon a different footing with respect to the
particular subject to which such
legislation related; but if a law,
based on the same classifications,
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should provide that the former of
such classes should have a certain
system of laying out streets and
the latter a different system, such a
classification would be clearly illusive, inasmuch. as the law thus enacted would bear no affinity to the
qualities or attributes forming the
basis of the classification:" BEASLBY, C. J., in State v. Parsons,
su/fra. A law is general if "it
does not exclude from its sway or
effect any place or subject belonging to the class to which it relates:"
Id. In State v. Parsons the statute
considered was "An Act concerning commissioners to regulate municipal affairs ;" and it was held
valid, though applying only to
Jersey City.
The same case came again before
the Court, and DiXoN, J., held that
a law, framed in general terms, restricted to no locality and operating equally upon all of a group of
objects which, having regard to the
purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to
make them a class by themselves,
is not a special or local law, but a
general law, without regard to the
consideration that within the State
there happens to be but one individual of the class, or one place
where it produces effects: State v.

Parsons,

40 N. J. L., ii Vroom, 123,
125 (1878). The case was approved
by SHERWOOD, C. J., in State v.
Herrmann, 75 Mo., 340, 348 (1882):

"Plainly a law may be general in
its provisions, and may apply to the
whole of a group of objects having
characteristics sufficiently marked
and important to make theni a class
by themselves, and yet such a law
may be in contravention of this
constitutional prohibition. Thus,

a law enacting that in every city of
the State in which there are ten
churches there should be three commissionersof the water department,
with certain prescribed duties,
would present a specimen of such
a law, for it would sufficiently designate a class of cities and would
embrace the whole of such class;
and yet it does not seem to me
(BHAsLEnx, C. J., of NewJersey) that
it could be sustained by the courts.
If it could be so sanctioned then
the constitutional restriction would
be of no avail, as there are few objects that can be arbitrarily associated, if all that is requisite for the
purpose of legislation is to designate
them by some quality, no matter
what that may be, which will so
distinguish them as to mark them
as a distinct class."
In State v. City of Trenton, 42
N. J. L., 13 Vroom, 486 (i88o), a
statute purporting to confer upon
all cities having a population of
not less than 25,000 inhabitants the
power of issuing bonds to fund
their floating debt was held to be a
special law, violating the Constitutional Amendment forbidding the
passage of private, special or local
laws to regulate the internal affairs
of towns. DIXON, J., said (p. 487):
"Under this clause of the Constitution it has already been decided, in
this State, that a law, to be neither
special nor local, need not apply to
all towns-that it will be general if
it apply to a class of towns. Thus,
cities have been held to be included
among *'towns,' as here intended,
and doubtless a law embracing all
cities and all townships would be
constitutional, for these bodies,
because of their marked peculiarities, are, by common consent, regarded as distinct forms of muni-
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cipal government, and so constitUting classes by themselves .
..
(p. 488): The class to be affected
must consist of individuals distinguished by some important characteristic to which the purpose of the
law relates, and must embrace all
those so characterized." TheJudge
shows the distinction between the
statute involved and that dividing
the cities of Pennsylvania into
three classes : Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa., 338 (i875); Kilgore v.
M agee, 85 Id., 401 (1877). The
classification by the Pennsylvania
statute, he says (p. 489), "'was
made for all the purposes of municipal legislation, and could therefore be regarded as a general classification, while in the present law
the grouping of cities is for a
special purpose only-to confer on
some a power of funding debts not
granted to others; and hence, in
this aspect, the law is special. - If
it be sustained, the classes into
which towns may be divided, on
this simple basis of population,
will be as numerous and diversified
as the purposes of the legislature,
and all the evils sought to be
averted by the abolition of the
power to legislate for individuals
will return under the form of class
legislation."
See, also, State v.
City of New Brunswick, 42 N. J. L.,
13 Vroom, 51 (i88o); State v.
Bogert, Id., 407 (x.8o).
In State v. Jersey City, 45 N. J.
L., 16 Vroom, 297 (1883), an "Act
respecting licenses in cities of the
first class," was held to be local
and special, and therefore unconstitutional, inasmuch as its pro-visions limited its operation to
cities having a population of over
iooooo, "according to the last census of the United States," "and
thereby preventing its ever apply-

ing to any other city than Newark
and Jersey City," using "population as a means of designating particular cities, to the exclusion of
others that may acquire.the same
characteristics:" DIxoN, J., p. 298.
In Ernst v. Morgan, 39 N. J. Eq.,
12 Stewart, 391, 394 (1885), an Act
providing for an assistant clerk in
a county exceeding 6o,ooo in population to be paid by the county if
in that county the fees go by law
to the county, but not otherwise,
was held to be interdicted by the
constitutional prohibition against
special legislation regulating the
internal affairs of towns and counties: Per RUNYON, Chancellor.
See, also, State v. Gaddis, 44 N.J.
L., I5 Vroom, 363 (1882).
In State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L.,
13 Vroom, 435 (i88o), it was held,
that although the title, "An Act
relating to the assessment and revision of taxes in cities in this
State," was general, yet this generality was curtailed by the words
in the beginning of the body of the
enactment, "that in any city of this
State where a board of assessment
and revision of taxes now exists,
such board, etc.," the effect being
to restrict the operation of the law
to those certain localities that were
possessed, at the time of the passage
of the enactment, of the body of
officers so designated," viz.: the
cities of Elizabeth and Newark.
"The result, therefore, is that the
Actwas intended to apply, and that
it does and must ever apply, tothese
two cities alone, and that the legal
effect of this law, as now constituted,
is the same as though it had in express terms declared that it was not
to be operative through the State at
large, but in the cities of Elizabeth
and Newark only:" per B]ASIl,
C. J., p. 439. The case was affirmed
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in 1882 by the Court of Errors and
Appeals, Chancellor RUNyON saying: "Normally, there can be under our Constitution no such thing
as local or special legislation to regulate the internal affairs of municipalities; but all legislation to that
end must be general and applicable
alike to all. Nor can any departure
from the rule be justified except
where, by reason of the existence of
a substantial difference between
municipalities, a general law would
be inappropriate to some, while it
would be appropriate to and desirable for others. There it would be
warranted, not only by the necessities of the situation, but by a reasonable construction of the constitutional provision. In such a case
the municipalities in which the
peculiarity exists would constitute
a class, and the legislation would in
fact be general, because it would
apply to all to which it would be
appropriate. But distinctionswhich
do not arise from substantial differences-differences so marked as to
call for separate legislation-constitute no ground for supporting such
legislation:" Hammer v. State, 44
N. J. L., 15 Vroom, 667, 669, 670
(1882). See, also, State v. Common
Pleas of Morris County, 42 N.J. L.,
13 Vroom, 631 (188o).
In State v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St.,
592 (1877), an Act providing "for
the improvement of streets and
avenues in certain cities of the
second class," and applicable to
" cities of the second class having
a population of over 31,ooo at the
last Federal census," was held to be
a special statute. XHi-T, C. J.,
said (p. 607): "Columbus is the
only city in the State having the
population named at the last Federal census, and the Act, therefore,
applies alone to that city, and never

can apply to any other. The effect
of the Act would have been precisely the same if the city had been
designated by name instead of by
the circumlocution employed."
In People v. Cooper, 83 Ill-, 585
(1876), "an Act in regard to the
assessment of property and the levy
and collection of taxes by incorporated cities in this State," was
held to be a local or special law,
within the intendment of the Constitution prohibiting the passage of
"any local or special law incorporating cities, towns or villages,
or changing or amending the
charter of any town, city or village." SCHOLVIELD, J., said (p.591): "The question . . . . is
not merely what kind of a law does
the 'City Tax Act' profess to be,
but what is the resulf it must necessarily produce? If it is to establish
dissimilarity in the powers and
modes of different cities in the levy
and collection of taxes, then, in
our opinion, since the law conferring these powers and prescribing these modes becomes a part of
the charters of the cities, it is forbidden by the Constitution, and
does not have the force of law."
In Devine v. Board of Commissioners of Cook County, 84 Ill.,
59o (1877), an Act limited in its
operations to counties containing
over ioo,ooo inhabitants, was held
to be a local law. SCOTT, J., said
(p. 592): "Its very terms preclude
it from having any application to
any county except the county of
Cook, for we take judicial notice
no other county in the State contains over ioo,ooo inhabitants. ..
. No express words that could
have been used by the General Assembly could limit the operation of
this law to the county of Cook
more absolutely aud definitely than
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thoseemployed." (P. 594): "Designating counties as a class according
to a minimum population, which
makes it absolutely certain but
one- county in the State can avail
of the benefits of a law applicable
to such class, cannot but be re-,
garded as a mere device t5 evade
the constitutional provision forbidding special legislation."
In State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo.,
340 (1882), An Act regulating "the
appointment of notaries public in
all cities having a population of
looooo inhabitants or more," and
providing that "the office of any
notary public in such a city holding
.a commission," etc., shall be
abolished, was held to be unconstitutional as being special legislation applicable only -to notaries
"in such city," and for the further
reason that it applied only to a
particular class of notaries, viz.,
those whose-commissions bore date
prior to the passage of the Act and
had not expired when the statute
took effect.
SHZRWOOD, C. J.,
said (p. 352): "The city of St.
Louis . . . . is to be regarded as
the city intended, and the only city
intended, as much so as if called
by name. But if St. Louis had
been thus directly designated no
one would have the temeity to
contend that such a law could
withstand the charge of being a
special law." (P.'353): "Setion 4
....
selects particular individuals,
i. e., notaries whose commissions
bear certain dates, from a general
class, i. e., all notaries in said jurisdiction, and subjects them to
peculiar rules, from . which all
others in the same class are exempt.
Such a law cannot be otherwise
than special." Referring to State
v. Tolle, 71 Mo., 645, 650 (188o) the
Chief Justice further says (p. 354):
"We still adhere to the doctrine,

there approved, that a statute
which relates to persons or things
as a class is a general -law, while a
statute which relates to particular
persons or things of a class is
special, and that classification does
not depend upon numbers:"
Wheeler v. City of Philadelphia,
77 Pa., 338, 348 (I87t); Ewing v.
Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo., 64, 75 (1884).
In State v. Tolle, supra, a statute
providing that "in all cities having
a population of more than Ioo,ooo
inhabitants," a board consisting of
the judges of the Circuit Court of
such cities shall receive bids and
award the publication of all advertisements, was held to relate to
"persons or things as a class," and
"did not single out and relate to
'particular persons or things of a
class,'" and was a general law.
Moreover, "it would only operate,
and was only intended to operate,
in the future, and its general rule
would operate as fast as cities having a population of ioo,ooo inhabitants should give occasion to apply
the law :" SHERWOOD, C. J., 75
Mo., 354. See also State v. Kring,
74 Id., 612 (1881); State v. Walton,
69 Id., 556 (1879). In Ewing v.
Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo., 64, 75 (1884)
the Act assailed was held constitutional by NoRToN, J., because it
"is not restricted or limited in its
operations only to cities having a
population of over ioo,ooo at the
time it was passed, but applies to
all cities in the State attaining
such population in the future." The decisions upon the subject
have been prolific in Pennsylvania.
Wheeler v. Philadelphia is the leading case, and has already been considered.
In Commonwealth v. Patton, 88
Pa., 258, 26o (1879), an Act providing for the holding of courts in
certain cities of the State, and re-
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ferring to counties containing over
6oooo inhabitants in which there
shall be any city incorporated at
the time of the passage of the Act
with a population exceeding 8,ooo,
situate at a distance from the county
seat of more than twenty-seven
miles, was held unconstitutional as
being "classification
run mad.
. . . There can be no proper classification of cities or counties except
by population. The moment we
resort to geographical distinctions
we enter the domain of special
legislation, for the reason that such
classification operates upon certain
cities or counties to the perpetual
exclusion of all others. . ..
Said
Act makes no provision for the
future. . . . That is not classification which merely designates one
county in the Commonwealth, and
contains no provision by which any
other county may, by reason of its
increase of population in the future,
come within the class :" per PAXSON, J.

In Scowden's Appeal, 96 Pa., 422,
425 (188x), an Act referring to cities
of the fifth class in counties having
6o,ooo population was held unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was
"merely an effort to legislate for
certain cities of the fifth class to
the exclusion of all other cities of
the same class :" per PAxsoN, J.
In Davis v. Clark, io6 Pa., 377
(1884), an Act relating to mechanics' liens, whose provisions were
expressly that it should not apply
to counties having a population of
over 200,000 inhabitants, was held
to be special in its terms and local
in its effect, since two counties in
the State had a population larger
than that specified in the Act, and
hence were excluded. MERCUR,
C.J., held (p. 385) that "the exclusion of a single county from the
operation of the Act makes it local.

. . . Within reasonable limits and "
for some purposes classification is
allowable. It has been sustained
on the basis of population of counties on the assumption that those
having a small population may
ultimately have one much larger.
Here the larger are excluded. We
cannot assume that their population will ever be reduced to less
than the number named." A similar decision was made in reference
to "An Act fixing the salary of
county officers in counties containing over ioo,ooo and less than
15o,ooo inhabitants, and requiring
the payment of fees of such officers
into the respective county treasuries." It was an attempt to legislate
directly for the few counties falling
within the limits designated in, the
Adt and selected from all others in
the State. The legislation was
special: McCarthy v. Commonwealth, ilo Pa., 243 (1885), per
GORDON, 3. Likewise, in Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa., 322 (1886),
an Act concerning the fees of certain officials of the Commonwealth,
cexcept in counties containing
more

than

150ooo

or less than

io,ooo inhabitants" was held unconstitutional by PAXSON, J. (p.
329). "It excludes perpetually from
its operation all cpunties having a
population of over I5O,OOO inhabit-

ants. This makes it a local law.
If it can exclude Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh, it may exclude every
other county in the State but the
one county seeking such special
or local legislation." In City of
Scranton z'. Silkman, 113 Pa., 191,
199 (i886), an Act relating to owners of real estate "in any county of
less than 5oo,ooo inhabitants'" was

unconstitutional, under the ruling
in Davis z'. Clark, supra,since "the
exclusion of a single county from
the operation of the Act makes

CLASSIFICATION OF LOCAL
it local:" per GREnN, J.
In
Appeal of the City of Scranton
School District, II3 Pa., 176, 190
(1886), an Act dividing cities into
three classes, to become effective in
cities of a class when adopted by
them, was held unconstitutional.
The Act "will be limited t the one
or more cities that do accept, and
that makes it local:" per GREEN,
J. In City of Reading v. Savage,
23 W. N. C., 332; 124 Pa., 329 (1889),
the same Judge held (overruling the
prior decision (1888) in the same
case: 22 W. N. C., 3; 120 Pa., i98;
and distinguishing the Appeal of
the City of Scranton School Dis-

trict, supra),that the section of the

20W. N. C., 173; 117 Pa., 235 (1887).

In Evans v. Phillipi, an Act passed

before the adoption of the Constitution of x874, regulating the collection of school taxes in certain
school districts, was held to be local,

inasmuch as it provided that none
of its provisions should apply to a

large portion, of the State.

The

same case also decided that the pro-

visions of an Act regulating the
collection of taxes in the several

boroughs and townships, that "this
Act shall not apply to any taxes the
collection of which is regulated by

a local law," is not in conflict with
the constitutional provision forbidding local and special legislation:

Act of 1874 (relating to the classification ofcities~acc6rdingto population) providing that any city of the
third class may become subject to
the provisions of the Act, and that
the mayor and councils of said city
may effect the same by ordinance
thereof duly passed, was not local

per CLARK, J. See, also, Bitting v.
Commonwealth, 20 W. N. C., 178

or special legislation.

of local laws existing when it was
adopted:" per TRuNKEY,J., p. 31.
In City of Philadelphia v. Haddington Church, i9 W. N. C., Iog; 115
Pa., 291 (1887), an Act relating to
revival of municipal liens in cities
of the first class, conferring unusual
powers of a judicial character on
the plaintiff's attorney was held unconstitutional under the clause
which prohibits special laws authorizing the creation, extension or
impairing of.liens. In delivering
the opinion of the Court, GORDON,
J., approved of the decision made
in the Court below by ARNOLD, J.,
as follows: "But the Act of 1883
does not of necessity embrace the
whole of a county even, but only a
city of the first class, which maybe
less than a county. Should the city
of Pittsburgh become a city of the
first class, there would be one law
in that city for the collection of

G"RBN, J.,

6aid: ,"When the requirements of
the fifty-seventh section are complied with in any given case of a
pre-existing city, such city enters

into the third class of cities whose
future incorporation has been provided for, and becorfes a constitutional part thereof. No cityFis prevented from doingthis, and all have
the opportunity of doing it. Those

that do not embrace the oppoi-tunity
simply remain as they were before,
and all that do embrace it become
members of a class whose existence
and all the elements of whose government are regulated by general
law. There is no possibility of any
-exercise of the powers or privileges
conferred by the fifty-seventh section, which can work affirmatively
a local orspecial result." See, also,
In re Henry Street, 23 W. N. C., 60;
123 Pa., 346 (1889); Evans v. Phillipi,

(1887). Malloy v. Reinhard, i9 W.
N. C., 43; 115 Pa., 25 (1887), was
approved. It was there held that

the Constitution of 1874, inhibiting
local legislation, "changes no rule

relative to the repeal by legislation
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municipal claims, and another for
the rest of the county of Allegheny." This decision is to the
effect that the revival of municipal
liens ought to be under a law co-extensive with the Commonwealth.
Legislation for classes on this subject is unconstitutional because
unequal and unnecessary.
In Ayars' Appeal, 23 W. N. C.,
97; 122 Pa., 266 (1889); Shoemaker
z. Harrisburg, 23 V. N. C., IO5;
122 Pa., 285 (1889); Berghaus v.
Harrisburg, 23 W. N. C., io6; 122
Pa., 289 (1889), it was held than an
Act dividing the cities of the State
into seven classes and legislating
for each class being unnecessary,
was obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition of special or local legislation and, therefore, invalid.
STERRnTT, J., said: "The underlying principle of all the cases is
that classification, with the view of
legislating for either class separately, is essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefor
exists, a necessity springing from
manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from
each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation
for each class separately, that
would be useless and detrimental
to the others. Laws enacted in
pursuance of such classification
and for such purposes are, properly
speaking, neither local nor special.
They are general laws because they
apply alike to all that are similarly
situated as to their peculiar necessities. All legislation is necessarily
based on a classification of its subjects, and when such classification
is fairly made, law& enacted in
conformity thereto cannot be properly characterized as either local or
special.
A law prescribing the
mode of incorporating all railroad
companies is special in the narrow

sense that it is confined in its operations to one kind of corporations
only, and, by the same test, a law
providing a single system for organization and government of
boroughs in the State would be a
local law, but every one conversant
with the meaning of those words
when used in that connection would
unhesitatingly pronounce such
statutes general laws. But, as was
said in Scowden's Appeal, sufira,
'classification which is grounded
on no necessity and has for its sole
object an evasion of the Constitution' is quite a different thing.
The purpose of the provision under
consideration was not to limit legislation, but merely to prohibit the
doing by local or special laws that
which can be accomplished by general laws. It relates not to the
substance, but to the method of
legislation, and imperatively demands the enactment of general
instead of local or special laws
whenever the former are at all

practicable:"

122

Pa.,

281

et seq.

In the recent case of the City of
Scranton v. Whyte, 30 IV. N. C.,
74, 76 (1892), XVIIuI4S, J., said:
"Classification of cities for purposes of municipal government was
recognized as valid in Wheeler v.
The City, 77 Pa., 338. Laws limited in their operation to a single
class of cities are not, therefore,
within the constittional prohibition of local legislation if they relate
to matters that are connected with
the organization or administration
of the city government or the regulation of municipal affairs .....
If such laws relate to other subjects
not within the purposes of claisification, they fall within the prohibition and are void .....
This is.
therefore, the test by which to determine the validity of a law relating to a given class of cities. If it
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relates to subjects of municipal
concern only, it is constitutional, because, operating upon all the members of the class, it is a general law.
If it relates to subjects of a general,
as distinguished from a municipal,
character, it is local, and therefore
invalid, although it may 'embrace
all the members of the class." In
Commonwealth v. Macferron, 31 W.
N. C., 320 (1893), it was held (per
WILLIAMS, J.) that the power to
classify being conceded, the conclusion that an Act passed for a
class is not a local law within the
prohibition of the Constitution is
irresistible. It is general ina strictly
local sense, since it embraces all
the members of the class which the
Legislature has created without any
violation of the fundamental law,
and which is, therefore, a proper
subject for legislation. So far as
the legislation affecting a city of
the third class conflicts with the
uniform general plan of municipal
government provided for cities of
the second class, so farit must, upon
its translation into that class, leave
its former system behind it; else it
could not adjust itself to the class
into which it has come, and the
whole scheme of classification
would fall. So faf as its former
legislation is not in conflict with
the general plan -ofgovernment for
the new class, so far it remains in
full force. See, also, Commonwealth
z. Wyman, 27 W. N. C.,. 245; 137
Pa., 5o8 (r891). In Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. v. Fricke, 31 W. N. C.,
324 (1893), it was held that while
Section 12 of the Act of March 22,
1877, purports to legislate for cities
of the second class, it does not relate to corporate powers, nor control
the corporate .officers of such cities.
On the contrary, in effect it attempts
to declare the effect of certain claims
filed in the courts of a particular

county, and also the effect of judicial sales thereunder, by virtue of
the process of said Courts, which is
not a legitimate subject for classified legislation. The section was,
therefore, unconstitutional.
In re Ruan Street, 25 W. N. C.,
349; 132 Pa., 275 (i89o), it was held
(per WILLIAMS, J.) that legislation
based on the classification of cities
is unconstitutional if it does not
relate to municipal affairs and is
not directed to the existence and
regulation of municipal powers
and to matters of local government.
In re Wyoming Street, 27 W. N.
C., 136; 137 Pa., 494 (1891), the
same judge said: "Some confusion
seems to exist, however, in regard
to the definition of a general law,
and a theory has been advanced in
several recent cases, and has been
contended for by the appellee in
this case, that the division of the
cities of the State into classes, by
the Act of 1874, which was recognized as a necessary classification
in Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa.,
338, requires us to hold any law to
be general which embraces all the
cities of a given class, without regard to the subject to which it
relates. This theory overlooks the
objects and purposes of classification, which are very clearly set
forth in the first section of the Act,
which divides the cities of the
State into three classes. These are,
to make provision for the municipal needs of cities which differ
greatly in population. Differences
in population make it necessary to
provide different machinery for the
administration of 'certain corporate powers,' and to make a difference in 'the number, character,
powers and duties of certain corporate officers,' corresponding with
the needs of the population to be
provided for. An Act of Assembly
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that relates to a subject within the
purposes of classification, as they
are thus declared by law, is a general law, although itmay be operative in a very small portion of the
territory of the State, if it relate to
all the cities of a given class. For
example, an Act relating to the
lighting of streets in cities of the
third class would be a general law
for the following reasons: (a) It
relates to the exercise of ' corporate
powers;' (b) it affects all the cities
of a given class in the same manner; (c) it affects the inhabitants
and property owners in such cities,
because of their residence and
ownership therein, and the circumstances and needs that are
peculiar to the class in which their
city belongs. But a law that should
provide that all applications made
by guardians, administrators and
executors for leave to sell the real
estate of a decedent for the payment of his debts in cities of the
third class should be made, not in
the court having jurisdiction of the
petitioner's accounts, but in the
Court of Quarter Sessions, would
be local law, and therefore unconstitutional. It would be applicable
to the same subdivisions of territory as the law relating to the lighting of streets, but it would relate to
the exercise of no corporate power
residing in a city, nor to the duties
of any municipal officer, nor to the
needs or welfare of citizens of a
city of the third class, as distinguished from other citizens of the
Commonwealth.
On the other
hand, it would affect the jurisdiction of the State courts, modify the
duties of public officers whose functions are not local but general, and
touch the inhabitants of cities of
the given class in the exercise and
enjoyment of their rights as citizens
of the State, not as dwellers in the

municipality. The test, therefore,
by which all laws may be tried is
their effect. If they operate upon
the exercise of some power or duty
of a municipality of the given class,
or relate to some subject within the
purposes of classification they are
general, otherwise they are local."
In WVeinman v. Railway Co., 20
W. N. C., 455; 118 Pa., 192 (1888),
"An Act to provide for the incorporation, and for the government
and regulation of certain railway
companies now incorporated or
hereafter to be incorporated in
cities of the second and third class,"
was held to be special "because it
related to a certain class of railway
corporations only, and local because its operations were confined
to cities of the second and third
classes, and, therefore, in contravention of the Constitution:" 31
%V. N. C., 328, per STERRETT, J.
NVILLIA-MS, J., said: "The subject
of this statute is street railway companies, which is a subject for general legislation; while the statute
professes to deal only with a limited
number of these railways, and these
are selected by reference to their
location in certain cities. Under
the guise of a general law we have
here one which is special, because
it relates to a few members of the
general class of corporations known
as street railway companies; and
local because its operations are
confined to particular localities."
In Reeves v. Continental Railway
Co., 3r V. N. C., 265, 280 (1893),
MITCHELL, J., says: "The essence
of that decision is that the formation of corporations, their corporate
powers, capital stock, dividends,
etc., have no relation to the classification of cities, and cannot
be made in any way to depend
thereon."
ALFRED ROLA.D HAIG.

